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South Africa’s industrial policy rests on Michael Porter’s logic of raising 
productivity to promote dynamic competitive advantage. Given high 
unemployment, however, a more Arthur Lewis-like emphasis on labour-
intensive development is also appropriate. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, evidence from sectors such as clothing shows that South African 
producers remain sufficiently competitive as long as minimum wages are not 
raised in pursuit of a Porterian strategy. The South African case suggests 
that it is both desirable and feasible for an industrialised labour-surplus, 
middle-income economy like South Africa to pursue a mix of strategies 





Standard development theory suggests that governments should select strategies 
depending on where they are in the development process. The Caribbean 
economist Arthur Lewis famously argued that for developing countries with 
‘unlimited’ supplies of labour absorbed in low-productivity agriculture, an 
appropriate development strategy entailed relatively low-wage, labour-intensive 
industrialisation (Lewis, 1954). As economies developed – or industrialised, in 
Lewis’ model – labour markets became tighter. Michael Porter later emphasised 
the role that government intervention could play to promote ‘dynamic 
competitive advantage’, especially in the face of rising competition from low-
wage countries (1985; 1990). But neither Lewis nor Porter imagined that an 
effectively unlimited supply of unskilled labour might persist in an upper 
middle-income country (in terms of GDP per capita) with a diversified 
economic base. South Africa is such a case.     
 
By the end of the apartheid era, in the early 1990s, South Africa had an 
exceptionally high unemployment rate and an unusually low employment rate. 
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Despite this, post-apartheid governments pursued a broadly Porterian strategy, 
using labour market and industrial policies to raise labour productivity to 
support ‘decent work’. This contributed, over the two decades since the 
transition to democracy in 1994, to very modest employment growth. The 
employment elasticity of growth has been low, compared to other upper middle-
income economies – despite South Africa’s exceptional unemployment. In this 
paper we argue that some labour-intensive production is not only desirable, but 
also feasible – despite globalisation and competition from lower-wage countries. 
Economies with a developed industrial sector and a serious unemployment 
problem can and should combine a Porterian productivity-raising strategy in 
some (established, advanced) sectors with a Lewisian labour-intensive strategy 
in others.  
 
 
South Africa’s unemployment problem in 
comparative perspective 
 
Creating income through employment has long been a development objective. 
The Preamble to Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, under which the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) was established, includes the 
‘prevention of unemployment’ and the ‘provision of an adequate living wage’ as 
some of the changes required for social justice and universal peace. The ILO’s 
convention 131 (1970) on minimum-wage setting advises policy-makers to 
balance social factors such as relative living standards and economic factors, 
including ‘the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of 
employment’ (Article 3).  
 
Figure 1 shows that across the world as a whole, the employment rate in middle-
income countries in the early 2000s remained steady at about 55 percent and in 
low-income countries rose to more than 65 percent in 2012. Figure 2 provides 
data on average unemployment rates, showing that they fluctuated globally 
within a narrow range of between 5 and 7 percent. South Africa is a spectacular 
contrast: An economy that, for about 40 years, failed to provide sufficient jobs 
for those who wanted them. This failure began in the 1970s as a combination of 
rising manufacturing wages (Hofmeyr, 1994) and lack-luster growth generated 
high and rising open unemployment (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: Ch.5). The 
failure deepened in the final years of apartheid, and then persisted into the 1990s 
and 2000s. As shown in Figure 1, South Africa’s employment rate (employment 
/ population aged 15 and above) was already, in 1996, very low relative to other 
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countries (at almost 45 percent),1 but then worsened, to about 40 percent in the 
early 2000s. After a short-lived improvement, it fell even further – and behind 
the average for other countries – after the 2008 financial crisis. South Africa’s 
unemployment rate is similarly high by international standards (Figure 2). This, 
along with rising earnings inequality, is the key determinant of South Africa’s 




Source: World Development Indicators (data modelled by the International Labour Organisation. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 
 




Low employment rates imply that a country is not fully utilising its available 
human resources. But as not all people of working age are in the labour market, 
a better measure of social stress is the unemployment rate (unemployment/ 
labour force). Figure 3 plots employment and unemployment rates of 79 middle-
income countries for which data are available. It shows that South Africa, 
together with its de facto satellites of Lesotho and Swaziland, have 
                                           
1 Data for employment and unemployment in South Africa prior to 1993 are suspect, and the 
standard data for 1995 are based on a survey subsequently shown to have sampling flaws 




unemployment rates of about 25% and employment rates below 50%, placing 
them in a small group of otherwise war-torn countries that perform poorly on 
both measures. Economic growth is inhibited, and poverty persists. Boosting the 




Source: World Development Indicators (data modelled by the International Labour Organisation. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates: South Africa in Comparative Perspective  
 
 
All other things equal, employment rates are likely to be higher in countries with 
higher ratios of female to male labour force participation (as this increases the 
labour supply) and higher in countries with larger shares of agriculture in the 
GDP (because agriculture can absorb surplus labour especially where there is a 
large peasant sector). Employment rates are also likely to be higher when 
economic growth has been strong, but this effect will be muted if labour 
productivity (output/employment) rises at the same time. Table 1 explores these 
hypotheses using multivariate cross-country regression analysis. Model 1 
accounts for 71% of global variation in 2012 employment rates. It finds that, 
controlling for the other variables in the model, an increase of one percentage 
point in annual real GDP growth between 2000 and 2012 was associated with a 
4.1 percentage point higher employment rate. An increase in annual average 
labour productivity growth of 1 percentage point over the same period was 
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Source: World Development Indicators (Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators). 
 




The model predicts an employment rate of 56.5% for a country with South 
Africa’s characteristics. This is 18 percentage points higher than South Africa’s 
actual employment rate of 38% and is the largest regression residual in the 
sample. Model 2 includes a dummy variable for being a post-communist country 
(showing that such countries have a 3.6 percentage point lower employment 
rate) and in this model South Africa continues to have the highest residual, with 
a predicted employment rate 19% higher than actually achieved (Figure 4).   
 
This suggests that there are important factors specific to South Africa at play. Its 
unique history is probably one of them. Like many other African countries with 
high land-to-labour ratios, industrialisation in South Africa was initially 
constrained by labour shortages (Karshenas, 2001). Colonial powers resorted to 
coercive measures such as forced labour to generate a labour supply, and in 
South Africa, apartheid policies destroyed the (‘black’) peasantry and created 
over-crowded reserves to supply migrant labour to the mines and farms 
(Feinstein, 2005). Such measures helped contain unskilled labour costs 
(although, in the early twentieth century, unskilled wages were no lower than in 
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much of Europe), but skilled labour shortages, exacerbated by racial 
discrimination, acted as a persistent constraint on growth (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005). Despite the high ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, firms were 
encouraged to invest in capital-intensive processes by government subsidies and 
tax breaks as well as by racial restrictions on hiring. This resulted in inefficiently 
high rates of capital investment, falling capital productivity and falling 
profitability (Nattrass, 2014c). By the time that open unemployment emerged in 
the 1970s as a large and persistent feature of the economic landscape, the South 
African economic growth path was unsuited for creating jobs for the millions of 
relatively unskilled people who wanted them (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).  
 
 
Table 1: Exploring the determinants of employment rates in 2012 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory variables 
(mean, minimum and maximum values for the 








Female: male labour force participation rate                                        






Agricultural share of GDP                                                                    






Average annual real GDP growth 2000 to 2012                                                






Average annual labour productivity (real GDP per 
person employed) growth 2000 to 2012  


















Number of countries in the model (N) 111 111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.72 
Prob>F 0.000 000 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 




Table 2 explores the global relationship between economic growth and 
employment during the 2000s. It shows that a one percentage point increase in 
economic growth was associated with a 0.29 percentage point increase in 
employment growth. If we include a control for being a post-communist 
country, then the employment elasticity of growth rises to 0.40. The models 
predict that given South Africa’s average annual compound growth rate of 3.5% 
over the period 2000-2012, average annual employment growth should have 
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been 1.7% (model 1) or 2.2% (model 2) whereas its actual average rate of 
employment growth was only 1.5%. Under conditions of labour surplus in 
which you might expect that South African policy-makers would have 
encouraged the growth of employment at a rate faster than the typical 
international pattern so as to make fuller use of available labour and reduce 
poverty, the actual rate of employment growth was in fact below par by 









Table 2: Regressing employment growth on output growth (2000 to 
2012) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 






Post-communist countries  -2.51*** 
(0.33) 
N 118 118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1321 0.4167 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
Note: Economic growth is the growth rate of real GDP; employment growth was estimated by 
subtracting the growth rate of GDP per person employed from the growth rate of GDP. *** p<0.01. 




Table 3: Employment elasticities and growth in upper middle-income 
countries 
 
 Employment growth/output 
growth (2000-2012) <0.45 
Employment growth/output 
growth (2000-2012) 0.45+ 
Unemployment rate (2000) 
<15% 
Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, China, Dominican 
Rep, Hungary, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Peru, Romania,  
Thailand, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Venezuela,  
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador,  
Iran, Malaysia, Mexico 
Unemployment rate (2000) 
15%+ 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Iraq, South Africa 
Argentina, Colombia, 
Macedonia, Tunisia 
Note: Economic growth is the growth rate of real GDP; employment growth was estimated by subtracting the 
growth rate of GDP per person employed from the growth rate of GDP. *** p<0.01. 




In short, South Africa is not only an international outlier in terms of its high 
unemployment and low employment rates, but has also performed weakly in 
terms of generating jobs through economic growth. Table 3 situates South 
Africa and other upper middle-income countries in terms of combinations of 
employment elasticities of output (employment growth between 2000 and 2012 
divided by real output growth over the same period) and unemployment rates.  It 
shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Iraq and South Africa share the 
dubious distinction of relatively high unemployment rates and relatively low 
employment elasticities. This means that in the absence of a fundamental change 
to the growth path, these countries are unlikely to grow their way out of their 
unemployment crisis any time soon.   
 
 
South Africa and the Lewis Model  
 
The post-apartheid government inherited an economy dominated by capital-
intensive sectors and this has intensified over time. Table 4 shows that the most 
capital-intensive sectors (energy and mining, logistics and finance) grew 
collectively from 36% of value-added in 1990 to 42% in 2013 and their share of 
the capital stock rose from 38% to 55%. South Africa’s capital-intensive 
character has been attributed to a specific cluster of activities dubbed the 
‘Minerals-Energy-Complex’ or MEC (Rustomjee, 1992; Fine and Rustomjee, 
1997; Fine, 2010). Following Rustomjee (1992), the MEC can be conceptualised 
as including the production of electricity and minerals and related manufacturing 
sectors such as chemicals, glass, plastics, basic iron and steel. Using 1988 input-
output data, Rustomjee found that the MEC comprised about a quarter of value-
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added and 63% of exports (1992: 327). Analysis of the 2011 input-output tables 
suggests that the MEC’s contribution to value-added and exports has fallen since 
then, although it still remains an important generator of exports (Table 5).   
 
  















Share of the 
real capital 
stock in 1990 
Share of the 
real capital 
stock in 2013 
Energy and Mining (electricity 
gas, water, mining and quarrying)  
1 13% 8% 17% 19% 
Logistics (transport, storage and 
communication)  
2 7% 10% 16% 18% 
Finance (finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services  
3 16% 24% 22% 21% 
Community, social and personal 
services 
4 25% 21% 22% 23% 
Manufacturing 5 20% 17% 12% 11% 
Other (Commerce, catering,  
accommodation and construction) 
6 19% 20% 10% 8% 




Analyses of MEC-cent red development usefully remind us of South Africa’s 
origins as a minerals-dependent enclave economy and the role that this 
continues to play in supporting parts of the manufacturing industry and in 
generating export revenues. It also focuses attention on the legacy of South 
Africa’s political-economic history in which powerful mining houses shaped the 
migrant labour system and diversified into manufacturing and finance, often 
behind protective tariff barriers and with the assistance of generous government 
subsidies (Feinstein, 2005). Yet whether it is a useful focus for understanding 
the core dynamics of capital accumulation in South Africa is a different matter 
(see also Bell and Farrell, 1996). Most obviously, other sectors have grown in 
importance, generating forward and backward linkages and growth dynamics 
beyond the MEC. One could, for example, just as easily identify a ‘Logistics, 
Agriculture, Manufacturing and Energy’ (LAME) cluster that is as integrated as 
the MEC and much larger (accounting for over quarter of value-added and gross 
profits, and about half of total employee remuneration). While it is true that 
LAME is a net user of foreign exchange and in this sense is dependent on export 
earnings from the MEC, it nevertheless represents a larger set of integrated 
economic activities and related political interests than the MEC and is also an 
important focus for government’s industrial policies. 
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Table 5: The MEC and other clusters in the South African Economy, 
2011  
 
 MEC LAME FMEC FLAME 
% of outputs returned as inputs into the cluster 36% 36% 35% 38% 
% of inputs coming from other firms in the cluster 59% 55% 65% 64% 
     
contribution to total value-added 17% 26% 32% 44% 
contribution to compensation of employees 15% 50% 39% 44% 
contribution to gross operating profit 20% 27% 40% 51% 
contribution to total exports  51% 37% 54% 40% 
Contribution to total imports 35% 76% 35% 77% 
Note: The MEC includes: coal and lignite, metal ores, other mining, coke oven manufacture, nuclear fuel, other 
chemicals, rubber, plastic, glass, non-metallic minerals, basic iron and steel, precious metals, structural metal and 
electricity gas and water. The LAME cluster includes: agriculture, forestry, fishing, food, beverages and tobacco, 
spinning and textiles, knitted fabrics, fur, leather and luggage, footwear, wood, paper, publishing, coke oven 
manufacture, nuclear fuel, other chemicals, rubber, plastic glass, furniture, general machinery, recycling, 
electrical machinery, electronic valves, medical appliances, motor vehicles, transport, telecommunications, 
renting of machinery, research and computer activities. The FMEC sector comprises the MEC and financial 
intermediation, insurance and pension, auxiliary financial and real estate activities. The FLAME sector 
comprises the LAME cluster and financial intermediation, insurance and pension, auxiliary financial and real 
estate activities. 




Recent neo-Marxist analyses have acknowledged the rapid growth of the 
financial sector (as shown in Table 4), but maintain that it remains strongly 
‘linked’ to the MEC, and hence that the MEC remains the core feature of capital 
accumulation in South Africa (e.g. Ashman and Fine, 2013; Bond, 2013). But 
while there are historic connections between mining and finance, it is 
questionable whether this link is stronger with the MEC today than that between 
finance and other sectors of the economy. Table 5 shows that including finance 
in the MEC cluster (FMEC) increases the size and reach of the MEC, but that 
including finance in the LAME cluster (FLAME) has an even stronger impact.  
 
What this suggests is that capital-intensity has risen in post-apartheid South 
Africa not because of the growth of the MEC cluster (with or without finance), 
but because there has been a general shift towards capital-intensity across all 
sectors, with faster growth in the historically capital-intensive sectors 
exacerbating the overall trend. South Africa’s labour-market and industrial 
policies which promote capital- and skill-intensive development, as well as 
significant support for capital-intensive mega projects (Black and Roberts, 2009) 
have contributed to this persistent bias against labour-intensive growth. It is only 
relatively recently that the DTI has started paying attention to more labour-
intensive activities such as tourism, agriculture and small-scale enterprises 




In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) won the first democratic election 
with an election manifesto, The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), outlining an expansionary set of policies in which higher social spending 
would address poverty and fuel demand and hence growth (ANC, 1994). The 
RDP, which was written with the ANC’s alliance partner, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), also contained commitments about labour-
market protection and achieving ‘living wages’. It described collective 
bargaining over wages and working conditions as ‘the basis for enhanced 
productivity in the economy’ and endorsed the legal extension (by government 
gazette) of minimum wages set by unions and employer organisations in 
bargaining councils to ‘all workplaces’ in the country (ANC, 1994: par 4.2.10-1, 
pages 81-2, par. 4.8.8, p.114). The ILO’s concern for living wages was clearly 
evident, but this was not seen as presenting any threat to job creation. No trade-
off between wages and employment was envisaged, the assumption being that 
higher wages would compensate business by boosting demand whilst 
encouraging them to be more productive (Nattrass, 1994).  
 
Unfortunately, once the ANC assumed power it became evident that the 
government was facing a debt crisis and that the prospects for demand-led 
growth were severely constrained (Nattrass, 2014a). In 1996 the government 
released a new economic vision, the ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ 
policy framework subsequently referred to as GEAR, arguing that restrictive 
fiscal policy was required to stabilise government finances and the 
macroeconomy (DOF, 1996). More controversially, it proposed a set of labour-
market reforms, notably that ‘industrial agreements which reach across diverse 
firms, sectors or regions should be sufficiently flexible to avoid job losses and 
should be extended to non-parties only when this can reasonably be assured’ 
(DOF, 1996: 19). The Presidential Labour Market Commission (LMC), 
reporting later that same year, came to a similar conclusion, recommending that 
the Minister of Labour exercise discretion before extending collective 
agreements to all firms so as to prevent job losses in the smaller, more labour-
intensive firms that tend not to be adequately represented in bargaining councils 
(LMC, 1996). Predictably, COSATU objected to GEAR’s macroeconomic 
policies and to the proposed labour-market reforms but was successful only in 
blocking the latter. The result was persistent wage pressure in the face of 
constrained demand and increasing competition: a toxic combination for job 
creation (Nattrass, 2014b).   
  
Job creation has been, at least rhetorically, a key policy priority for the post-
apartheid government. Yet the ANC has struggled to produce a coherent 
economic vision for achieving this and the three most recent development plans 
contain conflicting economic policies (Kaplan, 2013). What they share, 
however, is an underlying microeconomic assumption that international 
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competitiveness and industrial development has to be driven by labour 
productivity growth. This is testimony to the power of organised labour to 
maintain pressure on wages, to block labour-market reforms and to influence 
industrial policy. Put differently, with rising wages as a given, economic 
competitiveness in an open economy simply has to be based on rising labour 
productivity. South Africa’s industrial policy accordingly concentrates on 
boosting productivity, helping firms upgrade (usually by mechanisation) and 
assisting capital-intensive sectors where labour-productivity and value-added is 
high (DTI, 2011; Lewis, 2001; Hirsch, 2005; Kaplan 2007; Zalk, 2014). 
 
Productivity growth is important for sustainable economic development because 
it allows more output to be produced with fewer inputs, thereby raising living 
standards over the long term. But the extent to which labour productivity 
(output/employment) or capital productivity (output/capital stock) should be 
prioritised is an open question. In a developing country like South Africa where 
there is a large surplus of unemployed relatively unskilled labour and where 
finance for investment is relatively constrained, there is a strong economic case 
for a more labour-intensive growth path.     
 
The relationship between industrialisation and job creation in labour-surplus 
countries was theorised by Lewis in the 1950s. The ‘Lewis model’ describes a 
trajectory in which relatively low-cost labour is drawn out of subsistence 
agriculture and into manufacturing, fuelling a process of labour-intensive 
industrialisation until wages rise as surplus labour is absorbed (Lewis, 1954; 
Fields, 2004). It has been criticized for focusing only on unskilled labour and 
neglecting the role of existing proto-industrialists (small weavers and the like) in 
Asian development (Sugihara, 2013: 27; Saito, 2016: 86). But it remains a 
useful heuristic for describing the potential for low-wage labour-intensive 
development to absorb unskilled labour, even if this is only one aspect of a 
broader development path. The Taiwanese experience of rapid employment 
growth at stable wages in the 1950s, followed by wage increases and a shift into 
higher productivity sectors in subsequent decades as the labour-market 
tightened, was a good example of Lewis-like growth subsequently transforming 
into a higher-wage, higher productivity growth dynamic after surplus labour has 
been absorbed (Fields, 2004: 730). Indeed, the pattern of moving into higher 
value-added economic activities (where wages and labour productivity are 
typically higher) after surplus labour-supplies have largely been exhausted is a 
stylised fact of Asian development (Chamon and Kremer, 2009: 20; Lin and 
Rosenblatt, 2012; Lin, 2012) and is evident most recently in China, where the 
labour market has tightened since the mid-2000s (Zhang et al., 2011).  
 
An example closer to South Africa is Mauritius, where the development of a 
local labour-intensive clothing industry spear-headed by entrepreneurs from 
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Hong Kong helped catapult the country from high unemployment in the early 
1970s to such intense labour shortages by the end of the 1980s that workers had 
to be imported from China and elsewhere to fill the low-wage jobs Mauritians 
were no longer prepared to consider (see e.g. Subramanian, 2001; Brȁutigam, 
2003, 2009). As wages rose, the garment industry steadily declined and the 
Mauritian economy shifted more towards information technology and tourism. 
Some Chinese Mauritians moved their clothing factories out of the country, 
including to Lesotho in order to benefit from low-wage labour and access to the 
South African market. But whereas Lesotho is currently attempting a Lewis-like 
growth trajectory, post-apartheid South African policy, in effect, is seeking to 
maintain the economy’s relatively high-wage, high-productivity character 
without mopping up unemployment through a prior or simultaneous process of 
labour-intensive growth.  
 
This is partly a product of history in that Lewis-like labour-intensive 
development is strongly associated with labour coercion and racial oppression, 
particularly in the mining industry (Wilson, 1972; Feinstein, 2005). When large 
supplies of ‘surplus’ labour were revealed as open unemployment in the 1970s, 
the apartheid state responded by incentivising labour-intensive industry to set up 
in or near the impoverished reserves for the ‘black’ population. Some rural 
towns, like Newcastle in the Natal midlands, echoed the Mauritian approach by 
actively courting Taiwanese entrepreneurs to set up clothing enterprises there 
(Nattrass and Seekings, 2014). Wages were much lower in such labour-intensive 
industries as they were either exempt from minimum wage setting altogether, or 
were part of regional wage-setting arrangements. For organised labour, they 
were a threat to ‘decent work’ in the towns and an engine for perpetuating racial 
wage inequality. The remaining incentives for decentralised industrial 
development were removed in the 1990s and the wage-setting machinery was 
expanded to cover the whole of South Africa and to encourage national, rather 
than regional wage agreements. 
 
 
Globalisation and the rejection of Lewis-like 
growth in South Africa 
 
Post-apartheid policy-makers faced a choice: to maintain and grow capacity in 
existing competitive industries whilst reigniting labour-intensive development to 
address unemployment directly; or concentrate only on improving productivity 
in the high-wage, high productivity sectors in the hope that this would be a 
strong enough source of competitiveness that it would address unemployment 
indirectly through rapid and sustained growth. This choice has never been 
resolved entirely, but in practice, given the absence of any significant reforms to 
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the wage-setting machinery and industrial policy, South Africa has opted for the 
latter. This was partly due to the apartheid baggage associated with labour-
intensive development. But it was rooted also in an emerging development 
ideology, subsequently to become hegemonic, asserting that labour-intensive 
development in today’s globalised world is a ‘low-road’ to growth promising 
little more than a ‘race to the bottom’ because of competition from low-wage 
countries.  
 
The business economist Michael Porter argued influentially in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that comparative advantage (based on the relative abundance of 
labour and capital) was no longer sufficient to guide policy and that national 
competitive advantage depends inter alia on active state involvement to support 
innovation, competition and strategic clustering of firms as well as to encourage 
structural change in favour of higher value-added activities (Porter, 1990). But, 
whereas Porter recommended that governments should avoid intervening in 
markets to lower labour costs as this was usually counter-productive and not 
conducive to encouraging upgrading (1990: 88), in South Africa his warning 
transmogrified into a stronger and more radical claim that rising wages are 
desirable as they would prompt firms to improve productivity and hence 
facilitate more dynamic growth. This notion appeared first in the RDP but was 
spelled out more systematically a year later by the COSATU-aligned Industrial 
Strategy Project (ISP). In a book that has influenced industrial policy for almost 
a decade, the ISP argued that South Africa should actively avoid any 
‘restructuring towards low-wage, low-productivity forms of production’ (Joffe 
et al., 1995: 213) and that labour and industrial policy should be ‘premised on 
the need to move South African firms out of their low-wage, low-skill, low-
productivity vicious circle in which they are out-competed by the second-tier 
newly industrialising countries’ (1995: 214; Nattrass, 2001).  
 
In 2009 Ebrahim Patel was appointed to the newly created Ministry of 
Economic Development tasked with coordinating and planning the 
Government’s economic policies (in effect taking these functions from the 
Treasury). Patel had been General Secretary of the South African Clothing and 
Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) from 1999 to 2009, national labour 
convener in the peak level National Economic, Development and Labour 
Council (Nedlac) and chief negotiator in the formation of the National 
Bargaining Council for the Clothing Industry, the Labour Relations Act and 
related legislation as well as in various government-sponsored employment 
summits. From the 1990s he was a strong advocate of using government 
resources and policies to promote high-wage, high value-added forms of 
production. As Minister of Economic Development, he incorporated this into a 




The NGP proposed a ‘developmental state’ to support new productive activities, 
especially in light manufacturing, the mining and agricultural supply chains and 
in a range of knowledge- and skill-intensive activities (e.g. biotechnology) and 
in green technology (notably solar power). Resources were to come from 
progressive taxation and by boosting and ‘mobilising’ domestic savings, 
presumably by requiring pension funds to purchase ‘development bonds’ (2010: 
27). Although the term ‘developmental state’ is evocative of the East Asian 
interventionist state, the NGP (2010) had a radically different approach to 
labour. Whereas wages and working conditions improved in East Asia only once 
the labour-market tightened after decades of strong growth, the NGP – like the 
ISP before it – proposed to advance the South African trade union agenda as an 
integral part of the growth strategy. Making this a labour-absorbing growth path 
was seen as the job of industrial policy (to identify and support economic 
activities which have the potential to create large numbers of well-paid formal 
jobs in which workers have contracts, access to benefits, training and a career 
path). 
 
This task fell on the shoulders of Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry 
since 2009 (and Deputy Minister 2005-2009) and long standing member of the 
South African Communist Party. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
documents support the NGP vision and are replete with Porter-like discourse 
about the need for government to create and support ‘world class 
manufacturing’ – as if there is only one ‘best practice’ way of producing in an 
industry, and that ‘sustainable’ production inevitably requires a movement ‘up 
the value-chain’. For example, the economic rationale for the DTI’s support 
program for clothing (which primarily supports capital intensification and skills 
development) – is that ‘the sector lags behind its international competitors in 
terms of conversion efficiencies and other key indicators of world-class 
manufacturing principles, of which quality cost and delivery are the main 
drivers’ (DTI, 2011: 144). It talks about ‘competitiveness challenges’ but does 
not mention wages (2011: 142), which accordingly, appear to be off the agenda. 
Its stance is primarily one of supporting more long-term partnerships between 
producers and retailers (through the formation of ‘clusters’), upgrading 
machinery, reducing costs through lean production, subsidising training 
programs and otherwise assisting firms to cope with wage pressure by 
improving labour productivity.  
 
South Africa’s latest development strategy, the 2012 National Development Plan 
(NDP), reinforces this anti labour-intensive stance by characterising the country 
as being caught in a ‘middle-income trap’ with no real prospects of competing 
internationally in labour-intensive activities and hence facing no real alternative 
other than to compete in niche markets and move into higher value added 
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activities (NPC, 2012: 115). Indeed, the NDP appears to have given up on 
labour-intensive manufacturing altogether, declaring:  
 
‘South Africa’s manufacturing strength lies in capital-intensive 
industries. In the context of high unemployment, growth would ideally 
be sourced through expanded contribution of labour. However, to 
compete, the country’s cost structure requires an emphasis on 
productivity, products and logistics’ (NPC, 2012: 147–148).  
 
In other words, because wages and other costs are already high, tradable sectors 
are not seen as a source of significant direct job creation. This is left to small-
holder agriculture and domestically-oriented small- and medium-firms (NPC, 
2012: 115). Some regulatory reforms are proposed to assist such firms including 
entry-level wage flexibility and simplifying dismissals procedures (NPC, 2012: 
131-2; 134-5, 143). This, coupled with projected growth of 5.4% per annum 
until 2030, is assumed sufficient to boost the employment rate by 20 percentage 
points.2  
 
This, however, is over-optimistic. Annual growth of 5.4% is 25% faster than 
during the global economic boom of the 2000s and over twice that achieved 
since the 2007/8 global crisis (see Figure 5). It is also faster than average 
middle-income country growth between 2000 and 2007 – something South 
Africa has never achieved. According to recent projections by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014), South Africa is likely to grow at only 1.7% in 
2014 and 2.7% in 2015 and the South African Reserve Bank now calculates 
South Africa’s potential economic growth as no more than 2.5% (Anvari et al., 
2014). Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that economic growth of 5.4% 
could be achieved, the international model in Table 1 suggests that for a country 
with South Africa’s characteristics, boosting the employment rate by 20 
percentage points would require an even higher growth rate or sharply falling 
labour productivity3 – i.e. a substantially more labour-intensive growth path.     
         
 
                                           
2 Calculated from data in NPC (2012: 118).  
3 The NDP did not publish its underlying economic model. According to the international 
trends summarised by the cross-country regression in Table 1, for a country with South 
Africa’s characteristics, a 20 percentage point increase in the employment rate would have 
required either annual growth of 8.4%, or annual growth of 5.4% accompanied by a 3% 




Source: World Development Indicators (Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators). 
 
Figure 5: South Africa’s GDP growth rates in comparative perspective  
 
 
Are there labour-intensive options for South Africa in today’s globalised world? 
In the 70 years since Lewis formulated his model, production has become 
increasingly fragmented in global value chains (GVCs) as communications 
technology and falling transport costs enable countries to specialise in tasks 
rather than products or entire industries (OECD, 2013; Cattaneo et al., 2013; 
Baldwin, 2014). Over half of global manufactured imports are intermediate 
goods (primary goods, parts and components and semi-finished products) and 
more than half of the value of exports is made up of products traded through 
GVCs (Backer and Miroudot, 2013). As Gawande et al. put it, ‘the iPhone’s 
supply chain, which traverses more than ten counties for eventual assembly in 
China is the new “new”’ (2014: 3). Even simple products, like the t-shirt, are 
caught up in GVCs, with cotton grown in the US, exported to China for the 
manufacturing of clothing and then shipped back to the US for imprinting with 
logos and marketing, and then shipped to Tanzania (as used garments) for resale 





Table 6: Indicators of domestic and global inter-connectedness for 
manufacturing, mining and agriculture in the major emerging markets 
(2009) 
 
 Brazil China India Mexico Turkey South Africa 
Exports as % GDP 11.0% 26.7% 20.1% 27.3% 23.3% 27.3% 
Average applied tariff  13.3 8.0 9.3 4.8 2.9 7.4 
Intra-industry trade*  0.104 0.197 0.181 0.079 0.132 0.085 
% intermediates use ** 0.638 0.771 0.604 0.777 0.757 0.684 
Vertical specialisation*** 0.166 0.266 0.257 0.266 0.291 0.192 
Forward participation in GVCs 
**** 
27.2 13.4 20.3 11.5 15.9 17.3 
Backward participation in GVCs 
***** 
9.0 32.6 21.9 30.3 28.5 16.5 
Global value chain participation 
****** 
36.2 46.1 42.3 41.8 37.7 33.8 
Note: *|imports-exports|/(imports+exports) HS 6 digits; ** Fraction of output used as intermediates inputs by all 
other sectors; *** Percentage of output used as intermediates by exporters in the same country; ****forward 
participation (domestically produced inputs used in third country exports) as a share of exports; ***** backward 
participation (import content of exports); ******Share of exported inputs in exports plus share of foreign value 
added in exports. This is the sum of forward and backward participation in GVCs. 
Source: Gawande et al., 2014: 3, 12; Koopman et al., 2010: 35-36; OECD global value chains indicators May 
2013 (Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TIVA_OECD_WTO#); World Development 





Table 6 provides indicators of domestic and global inter-connectedness for 
South Africa and other major emerging markets. It shows that South Africa’s 
economic structure is fairly typical in that over two thirds of output is used as 
inputs into other products and that about a fifth of its output is absorbed as 
inputs by exporters. Its forward participation in GVCs (selling inputs to export 
producers in other countries) is relatively high reflecting the important role of 
commodity exports. Backward participation (buying foreign components for use 
in export production) is relatively low.     
 
Participation in GVCs can benefit developing countries by allowing them to 
embark on a Lewis-like trajectory on the basis of tasks rather than entire 
industries. According to Hausmann, this development can be likened to 
changing the rules in the game of Scrabble: initially only those countries with 
the most ‘letters’ (technologies, capabilities, infrastructure, and domestic supply 






‘split up value chains, allowing trade to move from words to syllables. 
Now, countries can get into business with fewer letters and add letters 
more parsimoniously….  Countries that started in garments – for 
example, South Korea, Mexico, and China – ended up reusing the 
accumulated letters (industrial and logistical capabilities) while adding 
others to move into the production of electronics, cars, and medical 
equipment’ (2014, npn). 
 
However, there are also risks involved in pursuing Lewis-like labour-intensive 
development through GVCs. As UNCTAD warns: 
 
‘participation in international production networks runs the risk of 
generating adverse terms-of-trade effects on countries, particularly 
those at the lower ends of production chains, and it creates few 
domestic linkages and technology spillovers. Moreover, developing 
countries at an early stage of industrialisation may become locked into 
low-value-added activities due to stiff competition from other 
suppliers to keep labour costs low, and because the tight control over 
intellectual property and expensive branding strategies of the lead firm 
block them from moving up the value chain. Even relatively 
successful middle-income countries do not face a level playing field in 
many of these networks’ (UNCTAD, 2014: x; 104-105; OECD, 2013: 
14). 
 
This concern resonates with South African policy makers and within a sub-set of 
the GVC literature arguing that countries should avoid the bottom (labour-
intensive, low-value added) end of GVCs and direct industrial policy towards 
moving firms into higher-value added segments (Fernandez-Stark et al., 2011; 
Gereffi, 2013; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). Countries are accordingly 
advised to help firms position themselves more favourably within GVCs by 
inter alia moving into more sophisticated product lines (product upgrading), 
using superior technologies (process upgrading) and increasing the skills content 
of operations (functional upgrading) (Kaplinsky et al., 2003; Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Gereffi, 2013: 18-19; Cattaneo et al., 2013). In this 
perspective, ‘upgrading is imperative, not only to capture increasing value 
within these global industries, but ultimately to survive within the industry’ 
(Psilos and Gereffi, 2011: 3). South Africa’s industrial policy stance towards the 
clothing industry is in precisely this vein: substantial resources have been 
channeled to the larger, mostly capital-intensive firms to upgrade their 





The ‘upgrade or die’ approach, however, rests on an overly static notion of 
competitiveness and assumes that there is a one-to-one correlation between 
higher value-added and profitability. For example, value-added in the garment 
GVC is assumed to be captured by large retailers and branded marketers who 
design and sell clothing, sometimes engaging in full-package production of the 
more sophisticated garments but mostly outsourcing mass production to low-
wage countries (Gereffi, 1994; OECD, 2013: 13). Yet as Tokatli (2013) has 
shown, even highly successful international apparel producers with design, 
manufacturing and retail capacity sometimes ‘downgrade’ by moving in and out 
of sub-contracted manufacturing for other firms if profitable opportunities arise. 
There is thus no necessary link between targeting higher value-added activities 
and economic dynamism; profitability matters and this is not always coincident 
with higher-value added production.  
 
Producing in the lower-value added segments can generate significant income 
for labour and capital, especially where there are scale advantages – as the 
Chinese assembly industry illustrates – thereby creating a strong developmental 
dynamic. As Kowalski (for the Working Party of the OECD Trade Committee) 
observes:  
 
‘Recently, and perhaps mistakenly, the concept of upgrading has been 
seen as the need to capture a growing share of domestic value added 
in exports or to targeting specific “sophisticated” products or 
production stages. This however misses the point that the volume of 
the activity may matter as much as domestic content or sophistication; 
important benefits can be derived from specializing in less 
sophisticated assembly activities and performing them on a large 
scale. Our empirical results show indeed that engaging more widely in 
GVCs, whether by using more foreign value added embodied in 
imported intermediates or importing more sophisticated intermediates, 
does appear to correlate with positive outcomes, such as productivity, 
sophistication and diversification of exports, even if there is a large 
heterogeneity across income groups’ (emphasis in the original) (2014: 
7). 
 
In other words, a diversified economic strategy which promotes a ‘wide’ 
participation in GVCs can diversify exports and promote productivity growth in 
key areas whilst also accommodating more labour-intensive, lower-value added 
production. Industrial policy should prepare for and accommodate structural 
change, even taking a leaf out of the East Asian playbook by generating new 
industrial capacity prior to the exhaustion of cheap labour supplies from 
agriculture (Porter, 1990; Wade, 1990; Chang, 2002). But it could do this whilst 
simultaneously sustaining and generating new job creation in labour-intensive 
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activities. There is no reason why countries have to choose one path or another: 
the global environment is flexible enough to accommodate a range of 
competitive strategies – but only if domestic labour-market policy is sufficiently 
accommodating. South Africa’s is not.  
 
 
Wage-setting and the destruction of labour-
intensive jobs in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s wage-setting machinery was introduced in the 1920s for ‘white’ 
workers and extended to ‘black’ workers after 1979. Devised at a time of 
import-substituting industrialisation, it rested on the assumption that product and 
process differentiation was limited. Both the institutions themselves and the 
minimum wages then set were shaped by the British experience, itself rooted in 
Britain’s high wages. In this context, setting minimum wages across the industry 
protected firms from unfair competition in the same product market and tariffs 
protected them from foreign imports. After the transition to democracy in 1994, 
the Labour Relations Act was rewritten not only to cover all South African 
workers but also to consolidate industrial-level bargaining and to require the 
Minister of Labour to extend collective agreements to all firms (whether 
unionised or represented in bargaining councils or not) where bargaining 
councils were deemed to be sufficiently representative. The ICTWSS database 
on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, W-setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts4 accordingly upgraded South Africa’s score for ‘mandatory 
extensions of collective agreements by public law to non-organised firms’ from 
1 (exceptional, applying to less than 10 percent of the labour force) to 2 (used 
regularly, and affecting more than 10 percent of workers) when South Africa 
transitioned to democracy (see also Visser, 2011: 8). In this database of 49 
countries, only one country besides South Africa (Switzerland) increased the 
scope of extensions in the 1990s whereas three countries reduced the scope of 
extensions: Australia from 3 (extensions virtually automatic and general)  to 2 in 
1992; New Zealand from 3 to 0 in 1992; and Slovakia from 2 to 1 in 2004. 
South Africa’s expanded use of extensions thus went against global trends, 
institutionally and economically. This is problematic for employment because in 
today’s globalised world, there is a greater degree of product and process 
differentiation and competition from foreign imports is much more intensive. 
Extending wages across the industry has a potentially far greater impact on 
employment today because sometimes firms in non-competing product markets 
are driven out of business and, whether or not they are in the same product 
                                           




market, their place is quickly filled with foreign imports.           
 
Consider the case of the clothing industry where since 2003, minimum wages 
have been set in the National Bargaining Council for the Clothing 
Manufacturing Industry (NBC) through collective agreements between 
SACTWU and various regionally-based employer organisations. As SACTWU 
has 50 percent of the votes (it is the only union) on the NBC, it needs the 
agreement of only a single employer association to obtain a ‘collective 
agreement’ in the NBC. Agreements are dominated by metro-based employers 
who can pay higher wages, in part because they produce for niche markets (such 
as government or top-end consumers) and in part because their production is 
more capital- (and skill-) intensive. Since 2003 the NBC’s collective agreements 
have routinely been extended by the Minister of Labour to all firms, whether 
represented in the NBC or not. Minimum wages for labour-intensive firms 
outside of urban areas (including in the old apartheid-era industrial 
decentralisation zones) tripled in dollar terms between 2002 and 2010. Many 
firms shut down whereas others continued to operate at wages below the 
minimum until pursued through the courts by the NBC and shut down by the 
local sheriff (Nattrass and Seekings, 2014).   
 
Falling effective rates of protection in the clothing industry between 1994 and 
2004 certainly increased competitive pressures on the clothing industry 
(Edwards, 2005: 768) but it was the combination of increased international 
competition from China and the advent of national wage setting from 2003 that 
drove job losses: between 2003 and 2013 the clothing industry shrunk by 50%, 
especially in labour-intensive firms in relatively poor non-metro areas (Nattrass 
and Seekings, 2012a; 2014). The result has been rising average labour 
productivity (as average capital-intensity increased) but at the cost of the 
destruction of the ultra-labour-intensive segments of South Africa’s last 
remaining labour-intensive manufacturing industry.  
 
The destruction of jobs in the South African clothing industry is a dramatic 
illustration of how labour-market and industrial policy can shape the dynamic of 
capital accumulation. Elsewhere the impact is more subtle as wage pressure 
simply encourages firms to become more capital-intensive, to shift out of 
labour-intensive sectors or avoid entering labour-intensive sectors in the first 
place. It is thus difficult to estimate the impact of wage-setting machinery on the 
economy because we do not have data on how the economy would have 
developed in its absence (see discussion in Nattrass and Seekings, 2012b). 
Bhorat et al (2009) find that the wage premium for workers covered by 
bargaining councils is higher at the bottom end of the wage distribution, 
providing suggestive evidence that bargaining council agreements discourage 
low-wage labour-intensive production. Rather than South Africa not being able 
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to compete with countries like China, the experience of job destruction in the 
South African clothing industry reveals that labour-intensive producers were 
competing successfully (albeit by failing to pay legislated minimum wages) until 
they were driven out of business by the bargaining council.   
 
The history of South Africa’s clothing industry also demonstrates the falsity of 
the assumption that without industry-wide minimum wages, there will be a ‘race 
to the bottom’. It is simply not the case that low-wage, labour-intensive firms 
necessarily drive higher-wage, higher productivity firms producing more 
sophisticated products out of business. Relatively high-wage clothing firms in 
urban areas co-existed with low-wage clothing firms in non-metro areas in 
South Africa (including in the highly subsidised industrial development zones) 
for over a century because they use different technologies and compete in 
different product markets - formal attire and pajamas, for example (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2012a). If there was going to be a race to the bottom it would have 
happened already. Rather, there is room for a range of job opportunities at 
different combinations or wages and productivity, if the minimum-wage setting 
machinery allowed it.   
 
The extension of collective agreements to non-parties has also been the subject 
of contestation in the Metal and Engineering Industry Bargaining Council where 
smaller firms complain about unaffordable wage increases negotiated between 
large employers and the dominant trade union.5 Lower-wage, labour-intensive 
firms in South Africa are driven out of business not by being caught in some 
existential middle income trap, but by a wage setting system that allows higher-
end, unionised firms to set wages too high for labour-intensive businesses 
producing at the lower end of the market. The problem is not collective 
bargaining per se, but rather the extension of these agreements across the entire 
country by a Minister of Labour not charged with having to consider any 
adverse effects on employment.   
 
The wage-setting machinery in post-Apartheid South Africa strengthened the 
power of organised labour and (big) business and in the process weakened the 
power of government by removing any discretion to take other factors 
(including employment effects) into account before converting collective 
agreements into legally binding minimum wages. Most countries set minimum 
wages, but through different processes and with more or less power in the hands 
of government. The ICTWSS data set includes a scale of government power to 
set national minimum wages that runs from 1 (set entirely by collective 
                                           




agreements with no government discretion) to 8 (government set minimum 
wages with no fixed rules). South Africa’s classification is a 3 on this scale 
(national minimum wages as set mostly through collective agreements which are 
extended by government). The dataset has scores for 46 countries and no other 
middle-income country has a score for government power/discretion as low as 
South Africa’s (or an unemployment rate as high). Table 7 reports the results of 
a simple regression of  the 2012 unemployment rate for these 46 countries on 
(log) per capita GDP, share of agriculture in value-added and a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if government or an expert panel set national minimum 
wages, and a value of 0 if unions and employers are involved. The regression 
shows that controlling for the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb 
surplus labour and for the level of development, having national minimum 
wages set by government (as opposed to business and labour) reduces the 
unemployment rate by 3 percentage points. This suggests that the institutional 
space for government to ensure that national minimum wages are set after taking 
into account a broader range of interests than those represented in collective 
bargaining institutions, matters for reducing unemployment.   
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of unemployment rates in 2012 
 
Explanatory variables 
(mean, minimum and maximum values for the sample, followed by 





Log of real GDP per capita in 2012, in 2001 dollars                                        





Agricultural share of GDP                                                                          




National minimum wages mostly set by government or an expert panel 
with no participation by unions or employers                                                







Number of countries in the model (N) 46 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206 
Prob>F 0.005 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 





The political-economy of growth and policy reform 
 
The post-apartheid growth path has generated winners and losers. As shown in 
Figure 6, real average remuneration has been on an upward trend alongside 
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rising capital-labour ratios (capital-intensity). But because average labour 
productivity grew faster than real wages, the overall share of income going to 
labour fell, and the profit share rose. Capital productivity also rose as the 
economy became more skill- and capital-intensive, contributing further to rising 
profit rates. In short, firms that were able to improve their labour and capital 
productivity or expand into relatively high-wage, high-productivity sectors, were 
the beneficiaries of the growth path. Labour-intensive firms who were pushed 
out of business by rising wage costs and increased international competition 
were the losers. Rising average remuneration indicates that labour as a whole 
also benefited. Note, however, that the benefits were unevenly spread, with 
incomes rising faster at the upper end and with some compression at the bottom 




Source: South African Reserve Bank, Statistics South Africa (Quarterly Labour Force Survey) and the Post-
Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) from Data First, University of Cape Town.  
 




The NDP calls for a ‘social contract that will enable South Africa to achieve 
higher growth and employment’ (NPC, 2012: 475). It is vague on details, but 
calls for workers (except the very low paid) to agree to accept wage increases 
lower than their productivity gains would dictate, and for business to reinvest 
profits in job-creating ways and not to fuel the growth in executive 
remuneration. In other words, the NDP is actually calling for a rising profit 
26 
 
share. This is presumably to finance investment given that corporate saving out 
of profits has been the only domestic source of financing gross capital formation 
since the global economic crisis (Nattrass, 2014a). The NDP proposes to 
compensate workers by lowering the cost of living (notably by keeping inflation 
and import tariffs low) and continuing to support skill development and 
productivity growth in higher-value added activities where there is more space 
for wage growth (NPC, 2012: 475-6). Organised labour, however, remains 
suspicious of anti-inflationary policies and any call for wage restraint, seeing 
this as an affront to the agenda of getting rid of the apartheid wage gap 
(COSATU, 2010; 2012). The prospects for the envisaged social contract are thus 
poor. 
 
COSATU’s ‘high-wage, high productivity’ strategy in support of ‘decent work’ 
is in effect at the centre of the government’s growth strategy. But there are signs 
that it is not necessarily a hegemonic position. For example, the then Minister of 
Finance, Pravin Gordhan, suggested in 2011 that changes to South Africa’s 
labour dispensation may be necessary to prevent further job losses in the 
clothing sector – a view subsequently endorsed by Trevor Manuel, a previous 
minister of Finance and currently the head of South Africa’s Planning 
Commission.6  Yet this has not resulted in any serious proposals to reform the 
extension of collective agreements across industries.   
 
Trade-union aligned intellectuals have justified continued wage pressure by 
pointing to the so-called ‘Lula moment’ in Brazil (Coleman, 2012) when 
President Ignacio Lula da Silva increased minimum wages and social security 
payments in the mid-2000s. This contributed to economic growth and poverty 
alleviation (ILO, 2011; Serrano and Suma, 2011). However, Brazil was further 
down the Lewis trajectory than South Africa when this policy was introduced. It 
had already redistributed its surplus labour from agriculture into urban work – 
informal and formal – in the second half of the twentieth century and by the 
mid-2000s the labour market had tightened. Unemployment rates were a third of 
that of South Africa and wealthy residents in Rio and elsewhere complained 
about the difficulties finding domestic workers. The combination of global 
boom, a tight labour market and strong domestic savings provided the ideal 
opportunity – or moment – to raise minimum wages and social security 
payments. South Africa is not in such an enviable position. With consumption 
already accounting for over four fifths of GDP and given persistent balance of 
payments problems (Nattrass, 2014a), the prospects for demand-led growth 
remain limited. 
                                           






According to the 2008 ‘Spence Commission’ on growth and development, 
countries which achieved strong growth in the post-war period shared a set of 
common features: they fully exploited the world economy; they maintained 
macroeconomic stability; they mustered high rates of saving and investment; 
they relied primarily on markets to allocate resources; and they had committed, 
credible and capable governments (Spence Commission, 2008: 21). But the 
Commission emphasised that there is no single recipe and that countries are best 
advised to move forward cautiously and with sensitivity to political-economic 
constraints: ‘the principle is expressed well by Deng Xiaoping’s oft-quoted 
dictum to “cross the river by feeling for the stones”’ (Spence Commission, 
2008: 4).  
 
South Africa already has a diverse economic base. The key challenge is to 
devise an appropriately diverse set of industrial and labour-market policies to 
support existing high-productivity activities whilst avoiding the kind of job 
destruction within labour-intensive firms witnessed in the clothing industry. 
Mechanisms ought to be explored to ensure that minimum wage setting does not 
prejudice labour-intensive firms. But what are the relevant stones involved in 
crossing this particular river? Organised labour has successfully resisted any 
adaptations to the labour legislation requiring the Minister of Labour to consider 
adverse employment effects before extending collective agreements. However, 
the Employment Conditions Commission, which sets minimum wages in sectors 
without bargaining councils, is required to consider employment effects, so there 
is a political and institutional precedent in this regard. Furthermore, COSATU’s 
own ‘September Commission’ of 1997 called for a labour-intensive orientation 
for industrial policy: 
 
‘Our overwhelming need in the short to medium term is to develop 
labour-intensive industry which is able to employ massive numbers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This suggests a focus on sectors 
such as clothing and footwear, furniture, plastics, 
electronics/electronic consumer goods, metal products, 
agribusiness/food processing, construction and tourism.’7 
 
Much of COSATU’s economic thinking was solidified in the 1990s before the 
entry of China into the global economy and the associated dramatic expansion of 
GVCs. If space can be created, perhaps through the social accord processes 
favoured by the NDP, for constructive reflection on the implications of today’s 
globalised world for labour-market policy and job creation, it is possible that 
                                           




COSATU may agree to policy reforms designed to foster the kind of labour-
intensive growth it once demanded.  It may agree to the creation of export 
processing zones in which previously employed clothing workers negotiate 
wages directly with firms (and at below minimum wages) on the proviso that all 
production is exported (Kaplan, 2014). 
 
But such measures will probably have to be accompanied by other concessions 
to reduce inequality such as measures to restrain excessively high executive pay 
(which fuels resentment among low paid workers, particularly when they are 
being asked for wage restraint) as well as welfare policies to get income into the 
hands of the unemployed as fast as possible. South Africa already has an 
exceptionally pro-poor welfare regime in terms of its pro-poor social assistance 
policies (Seekings, 2002; 2014; World Bank, 2014) yet the scale of the 
unemployment problem is such that further measures should be considered such 
as an employment guarantee scheme (Philip, 2012) or even a basic income grant 
(Standing and Samson, 2003). This will require additional taxation and 
consideration should be given to new wealth taxes (notably on financial assets) 





In a globalised world, a very low employment rate and high unemployment rate 
in an upper middle-income economy pose a severe challenge to both policy-
makers and development theorists. Policy-makers face not only strong pressure 
to create jobs, but also powerful trade unions representing mostly skilled 
workers, widespread expectations of ‘proper’ or ‘decent jobs’ paying high 
wages, and inherited institutions that sustain a high-wage, high-productivity 
growth path. Most development theory is of little help in the case of South 
Africa. Standard theory suggests that economies at low levels of development 
(or industrialisation) should go down a labour-intensive growth path, but 
economies at higher levels of development (or industrialisation) should 
emphasise raising productivity. Existing theory provides little guidance on how 
to tackle high unemployment in an economy that is already industrialised. 
 
The South African case confirms that, under these circumstances, the single-
minded resort to a Porterian strategy of raising productivity results in low 
employment growth, persisting unemployment and ‘exclusive’ rather than 
‘inclusive’ growth. Social welfare programs can, at most, mitigate these 
outcomes. In cases such as South Africa, Lewis’s proposals for surplus-labour 
economies remain relevant: Labour-intensive growth needs to be pursued, in 
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